Abstract: Recent developmenta ia aoncooperative game theory (especially those dealing with information tranamiasion and equilibrium refinements) are illualrated by means of variations on a simple market entry game.
Introduction
During the laat decade there 6a' been a tremeodous increase in the use o[game theoretic modeling and methodology io the social sciences, especially in economics, sccompanied by a considerable progress in the development of the theory itsel[. My aim in this paper is to illustrate some of these recent devebpmenta and to show why they were aecessary for lhe applications to be successful.
Emphasia will be oa the intuitive ideas, not on the formal concepts. For a deecription o[ the latter, the reader may turn to VAN DAMME (1987) .
The two areas in economica lhat have probably profited most from adopting game theoretic modcls are 'industrial organizatioo' and`the economia of information'. In lhe present paper we consider variationa on a simple market entry game. This example is choaeo to allow illustration of some of the basic issues in these areas, as well u of lhe game theoretic problems involved.
In Section 2, the most aimple variant o[ this game is considered (Fig. 1) . The game o[ Fig. I is one of per[ect informalion and illustrates the difference between Naaó equilibria and subgame perfect equilibria. In Section 3 modifications o( the gsme are introduced that have incomplete information. The examplea in thia section illustrate the notion of sequential equilibrium, as well as wlty it ia oecessary to refine lhia wncept. Varioua such rcfinenxnla are brielly discuased.
The games considered in Section 9 are eo called aignaling games. They have the following structure: There are two players, one informed and one unin[ormed; the iaformed party moves first and ita action is observed by tbe uninformed; the unin[ormed draws inferencea about which CentER for Economic Reseurh, Tilburs Usiversitr, The Netherlsnds.
Op~rations aeseareb Proceedlnq~19a9 (c)Sprtnqer-Verlag serltn Neidelberg 1f90 as intormation the other baa and then taka an action; the payof[s to boló playas depwd on the actions taken and on the intormation. The essential question is how much in(otmation will be revoalod in oquilibrium. Typically, however. lhere exist multipk equilibria, both pooliag ooes (no infonrutioa transfer) as well as separating ones (full intorrttation revelation) and óybrids (part of the information is revealed). More refined equilibrium notioas try to upture the ides, called Forward laduction, that tbe uniatormed party should realite that the other will reveal only that information that is profitable lo him. Sxtioa 3 makes this idea more preciae.
It should be clear that examplea o! signaling gama abound. Let us just mention a tew: (i) Finance (buying back sharea signsls that they are undervalued), (ii) Macroeconomia (Mrs T.
wants to aignal that ahe is really tough on inllation), (iii) InteUigenoe (how to show that you are not a double spy?), (iv) Accounting (You know you chealed but the tax inspector does not), (v) Advertising (a more exlended warranty aignals higher quality), (vi) Bargaining (how to show your strength?) and (vii) Politio (how can Mr Krenz show that 6e ia~different" from Mr Honecker?, Is tlre opening of the Dcrlin Wall together with displaying the luxurics of Wandlitz enough to establish credibility? Hence, the question o( óow to solve these gamea ie of some importance. (It is worthwhile to note that signaling games were firat studied in SPENCE (1973) .)
In Section 4 we turn to the case where the private in[ormatioa Lhat a player óas is not exogenously determined, but rather concetns what he will do in the [uture. It is ahown that the idea of Forward lnduction may increase the predictive power of game theory also in this case. Section S considers an even more elaborate model in which there is simultaneous signaling of private in[ormation about the past (i.e. the type) and the future (i.e. the actions). The model o[ that Section, although relatively simple, is a prototype of the so called'reputalion' models in macro-economics, i.e. how, in repcated context, one can get a reputalion for being tough (or for beíng cooperalive).
Again Forward Induction is an esscntial element when trying to interpret aignala. Thc paper emphasizca the underlying idcas ralher than the (ormalities. The discussion will make ckar that many important problems in the area are atill open, and aorne opcn problems are rncntioncd in the text. It ia hoped that the malerial signals that thia is a very chalknging area to work in. 
Market Entry: Incomplete Information
Consider the muket entry situation discussed in the previow section but aow assume lhat if both firms enter the outcome is determined by a battle, the wianer ot whicó is the financially strongest firm. There are two poasibilities: Firm I is either strong (ia which case it wins the battle) or weak (and then it loosea). Assume lhat the loosing firm loosea a, that firm II makes an overall profit of b if it drives the weak firm I out o[ the market and that firm I loosa s(which may be positive or negative) when it wins the battle [rom firm Il. Assume thst firm 1 kaows which case prevaib but that II only knows that I is strong with probability 1-t and weak wiló probability t. (t small but positive.) Assume also that these belie[s ue comrnoa kaowledge. Again firm I mova first and firm I's choice is obxrvable. Nole that the essential assumption is that the market may be profilable for ll even as a duopoly, but that there is only a very amall probability that this is the case. The game now has onasided incomplete in[ormalion; it may be represented by a tree in which first nature determines which firm is superior, then firm 1(having thia informalion) 1'he game is ea,y to solve i( s is negative. In this case it is a dominant strategy for the atrong firm 1 to entu. Firm 1[ knows lhis and asxsxs a probability of st least 1-t that it will loox a i[ it enters sv well. Ilence, i[ t is small, firm lI will choox to stay OUT after I óas gone IN. The weak firm I, knowing this, also choose~IN. Hence, the prexnce ot the strong firm I provides a positive externality for the weak type of this firm. In the incomplete in[ormation game, the weak type has payoff one whereas its payo(i would be zero it il were commoa knowledge that it were weak.
Thinga become more interesting i[ z~0. Intuitivdy one would argue that, it t is small, the solution should not be mucó dif[erent trom the one where it is commoo knowledge that firm 1 ia strong (t -0). The latter was derived in the prcviow section: The strong firm 1 chooses IN and after this choice 11 decides to remain OUT (which again enables to weak firm I to also enter). proposed snd lack of space preventa a detailed discussioa here (see VAN DAMME (1987, Ch. 10) ), but tl~e main ideas may be sketched briefly (also see CHO AND KREPS (1987) Similarly, to force the weak type to choose OUT, we should óave
If x G a only the first constraint is binding, hence, the strong type is more inclined lo deviate. ( I9S7) for example) but none of these is entirely satisfactory. All these concepts are based on tlre idca tlrat, since it is in the intcrest of the types of firm I to pool at 1N they will do so, hence, these concepta assume that different types of a player can cooperate to a certain exlent (allhough they are not physically present at the same point in time) and they assume away coordiuation problems. Ilence, the state of the art is that current refined noncooperative equilibriwn concepts do nut succeed in reducing the game o ( Fig. 2 to what ( at first) seems the unique plausible outcome. Apparenlly some work remains to be done. To wnclude thia aection, le! us however remark that thcre exista an entirely different lheory ( via. that of HARSANYI AND SELTEN (1988)) that doea not iocorporate the ides of forward induction, but that producea the'plauaible' outcome in the game of Fig. 2 . Thia theory ia baacd on uniform perturbationa, i.e. on paaaive updating, henu, whenever something uoexpected happena one doea not deduce anything but rather one asaumea that the ex ante probabilitiea are atill valid. Therefore, if e C a~(a f 6), 11 will respond to an unexpected iN with OUT and tbe 2 typea of firm I can aafely chooae 1N.
Advertising and Repetition
Gct ua rcturn to the simple model o[ Section 2 but let ua now asaume that firma make their entry Indeed there ia a link between tlte 2 concepts (see KOHLBERG AND MERTENS ( 1986) and VAN DAMME ( 1989)), Forward Induction genetally iu more rmtrictive, however~.
The latter claim may be illustrated by comidering the game ia which, betore making the eotry deciaion, the 2 firms simultaneoualy decide whether to advertise or not. ( Hence, also fitm 11 now haa the possibility to advertix, and w.l.o.g. we may assume tbat its advertising costs ate also e.)
Assume that belore making the entry decisioa, it is common knowledge which firms advertised.
Tlte normal torm o! this game is an 8 x 8 bimatrix game and by eliminating dominated strategies it cannot be reduced that rnuch. i lowever, Forwud Induction atill allows to elíminate many eyuilibria and Icads to the conclusion that, in any`rensibk' equilibrium both firma must advertix with positive probability. Namely, consider a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in which no In order to simplify the derivation below somewhat we will assume that 1" ;E I4 i[ n~k( i.e. dilferent competiton in different mukets) ao that only 11 ia a"long-run"
player, but qualitatively the analysis would also go through with two long run playera. In the game just described, there is a unique subgsme perkct equilibrium: Firm I~entera in market n (for any n) and II etays out everywhere. To some extrnt, this result ia wunterintuitive aa one might have expected that If will invest to require a reputation for toughneas. Specifiully, firms
[" with n large may feu that if they enler, II will choose IN as well in order to convince firma It (k G n, k not too amall) that they bettu stay out; and as a consequence firms I. (n luge) would prefer to atay out. Hence, one might have expected that II uptures at leaet the initial mazketa.
The (act that tormal game theoretic reasoning does not wpture the intuition in this case ia known as the chaiu store paradox (SELTEN (19T3) ).
ln the remainder o[ this section we show that the equilibrium may be completely diHerent (and may be more in accordance with the inluition) if the firtru I jwt aasign a amall, but poaitive probability to the evwt that 11 may be committed to IN. Specifically, we sssume that each firm I" believea that there ia a probabiGty c that II is an automston that is programmed to play always IN in the game of Fig. 1 . The heuristic ugument for why the outcome is difierent is that now reputation argumenta can come into play. The ugument rune as followa: Firm I" should choose IN i[ the probability that 11 choosea IN as well is suf6ciently amall, otherwise it ahould stay out. Clearly, the probability that II chooses IN in market n is not zero: Il may be committed.
Ilowever, 1" should consider the probability that 11 choosea 1N to be luger than the probability that II is committed. Na~nely, i! player II would choose OUT a(ter IN, II would reveal itself as not being the automaton, hence !I would receive zero for the reat of the game. (Whea it becomes common knowledge that ll is not wmmitted, playera continue with the subgame per[ect eyuilibrium described above.) However, if 11 choosea IN a[ter OUT, the firms Ik with k G n may revise upward their beliet that II is committed and they may conclude that it is better to stay out. Hence, if n large, firm 1" realizea that H has such a strong deaire to pretend lo be an automaton, that, there(ore, the probability of fought entry ia so large that it is better to stay out.
Consequently, 1[ will indced capture the initial markets.
Tl~e formal analysis proceeds by backwards induction. (See KREPS AND WILSON (1982a) or VAN DAMME (1987, Ch. 10) be the probability that I" attaches to the event that 1l ia an sutomatoa, let e" be the probability that the noncommitted firm lI choosea IN after the IN o[ firm l," and let j be lhe probability I" assigns lo entry being fought, j -p" t(1 -p.)e.. Finally, let v" be the overall equilibrium payo(f of tlie noncommitted firm II summed over the markets 1,...,n if beliefa in market n ue p,,. (We will show that these payoffs are almost always unique.) We assume 0 G a G l.
Since player 1" ia "short run', his decision is easy: Choose 1N 
